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NOTE 
IF YOU BUILD IT, HE WILL COME:1 JUDICIAL TAKINGS 
AND A SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND 
Ian M. Frame† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution is a document that has been, and 
continues to be, the subject of infinite debate and interpretation. At the 
center of this debate are questions that initially seem deceptively simple, but 
they have given way to a wealth of legal debate and a vast amount of 
jurisprudential opinion. The outcome of these debates plays an 
instrumental role in our everyday lives, affecting everything from civil 
liberties to a citizen’s rights in private property and the extent to which 
those rights can be disrupted by state intervention. 
The Constitution is a document of enumerated powers.2 Commensurate 
with the principles of federalism, those powers that are not specifically 
ceded to the federal government are left to the states and to the people.3 
This dynamic alone has been the subject of many contentious debates.4 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, J.D. Candidate 2012, Liberty 
University School of Law; B.S., Old Dominion University. I would like to thank my family, 
especially my parents, Rodney and Kay Frame, for without their unwavering love and 
support I would have nothing in life. Additionally, I would like to thank my beautiful wife 
Amanda, who has sacrificed her time and given her utmost dedication to support me in all of 
my pursuits. Above all, I give all praise and glory to Jesus Christ, my Lord and Savior. 
 1. The title is derived from the film FIELD OF DREAMS. See FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 
Studious 1989). In the film, while working in his cornfield, the lead character, played by 
Kevin Costner, hears voices saying “If you build it, he will come.” Convinced that these 
voices desire him to build a baseball field, Costner plows over the majority of his cornfield to 
build a baseball field. Once the field is finished, famous baseball players from years past come 
to use the field as their own, depriving the lead character of his ability to produce corn. 
During the film, the baseball players, while letting other in, refuse to allow Costner to enter 
the area behind the outfield perimeter. 
 2. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
 3. The Tenth Amendment explicitly provides that those powers that are not given 
directly to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved for the states and the 
people. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This amendment was implemented to preserve the freedom 
and independence of the sovereign states. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 
(1931). 
 4. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (beginning its discussion of the 
extent of the power granted to the federal government under the Commerce Clause by 
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Those powers expressly given to the federal government are divided among 
the three equal branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.5 Implicit in 
these powers are the functions of government that each branch was created 
to perform. As Alexander Hamilton wrote:  
The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the 
sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the 
purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of 
every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, 
has no influence over either the sword or the purse.6 
Additionally, the Constitution can be described as a system of restraints 
placed upon the functions of government.7 These restraints can operate 
internally by putting restrictions on the operations and overt reach of 
government control. These restraints can operate externally by prohibiting 
the addition of government functions, laws, and controls that may conflict 
with the Constitution, unless their validity is satisfied in the form of a 
constitutional amendment or a constitutional convention. 
The text of the Constitution contains express language stating the powers 
and restraints that operate on each branch of government. Ambiguity exists, 
however, where the text does not specifically direct the power or restraint 
toward one particular branch. The question then becomes, to which branch 
does the ambiguous clause or provision apply?  
While the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment succinctly provides 
an object and purpose, thus justifying its presence, it is silent on which 
branch of government it restrains.8 This overt silence has led to much 
debate as to which branch the Takings Clause applies and as to the real 
                                                                                                                                      
recognizing the principle of the enumerated powers); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-48 (1985) (discussing the extent of governmental power and its 
limitations on the federal government); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) 
(discussing the extent of the power granted to the federal government under the Commerce 
Clause). 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. I-III. 
 6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 7. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528, 552. 
 8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment does not operate in reference to 
any specific branch of government. It simply prohibits the act of taking private property “for 
public use, without just compensation.” Id. 
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object of its carefully crafted language.9 This Note addresses the topic at the 
forefront of the Takings Clause debate, namely, whether the Takings Clause 
should be extended to the judicial branch through what is commonly called 
the Judicial Takings Doctrine. 
This Note focuses on the seminal case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection10 (hereinafter “Stop 
the Beach”), which articulates support for the Judicial Takings Doctrine. In 
Part II, this Note examines the background of Stop the Beach and related 
jurisprudence that reveals how the United States Supreme Court has 
handled similar issues. In Part III, this Note discusses the theory of judicial 
takings and analyzes what benefits and detriments the adoption of the 
Judicial Takings Doctrine may trigger. It also explores whether a Due 
Process analysis may provide sufficient protections in place of the Judicial 
Takings Doctrine. In Part IV, this Note addresses the questions largely 
unanswered by the Court and proposes a manageable standard to 
determine whether a judicial decision has deprived a person of an 
established property right. Finally, this Note discusses where the theory of 
judicial takings stands after Stop the Beach and discusses whether a 
subsequent court would stand on strong ground in adopting it.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Takings Clause  
The Takings Clause provides that “private property [shall not] be taken 
for public use without just compensation.”11 The Clause is not addressed 
toward any specific branch of government; it is concerned merely with the 
act of taking property.12 There is no textual justification for saying that the 
state’s power to take property shall vary by branch.13  
                                                                                                                                      
 9. See J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1747 (2005); W. David Saratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1487 (2004); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990). 
 10. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 
(2010). 
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Note does not seek to address what just 
compensation would constitutionally entail. Nevertheless, limited treatment will be given to 
the notion that within the confines of the Constitution, courts lack the tools to grant just 
compensation.  
 12. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 13. Id. 
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The common taking occurs when a state exercises its power of eminent 
domain by seizing private property for public use and providing the owner 
with just compensation.14 A taking also occurs when the government uses 
its own property in a way that destroys private property rights.15 The 
Takings Clause applies as fully to the landowner’s riparian water rights as it 
applies to the landowner’s estate in land.16 States also effect a taking when 
private property is re-characterized as public property.17 This could occur 
when a court orders a party to deposit a sum of money into a state account 
held for the party’s creditors with a state statute mandating that interest 
earned on that account be withheld from the party.18 
Initially, the Bill of Rights applied exclusively to the federal government, 
not to state governments.19 Beginning with the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868, the United States Supreme Court steadily declared 
certain provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states by virtue of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 It was not until 
1897, however, that the Supreme Court declared that the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment should be extended to the states.21 
B.  Property Rights of Florida Riparian Owners 
Under Florida law, the State owns, in trust for the public, the land 
permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore, which 
is the land between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line.22 This is 
commonly referred to as the Public Trust Doctrine. The State has the power 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 15. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (holding that a taking has 
occurred when the government takes an easement over property to fly low-flying military 
aircraft over it, which in this instance, rendered the property uninhabitable due to the 
amount of noise from the aircraft). 
 16. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1871). 
 17. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharm., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). 
 20. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  
 21. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) 
(holding that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that the states provide 
just compensation when they take private property for public use, which was the first in a 
continuing line of cases that extend provisions of the Constitution to the states). 
 22. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
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to sell this land, but only when doing so is in the public’s interest.23 
Additionally, the law may authorize the private use of the public trust land, 
but only when the use does not conflict with the interests of the public.24 
Under Florida law, the mean high-tide line, which is subject to statutory 
limitations, is the boundary between private beachfront and State-owned 
land.25 These provisions represent a codification of Florida common law 
represented by Article X of the Florida Constitution.26 
In Florida, beachfront property owners, or littoral owners, have certain 
additional property rights established under common law; some of these 
rights are the right to access the water, the right to enjoy an unobstructed 
view of the water, and the right to receive accretions to their littoral 
property.27 An accretion is the addition of sand or sediment to waterfront 
land that occurs gradually and imperceptibly—so slowly that one could not 
see the change occurring, though the change is noticeable over a period of 
time.28 When an accretion occurs, the littoral owner has a right for the 
property line to adjust according to the new mean high-tide line.29  
It is important to note that an accretion is different from an avulsion. An 
avulsion occurs when there is a “sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to 
land by the action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the 
course of a stream.”30 When this occurs, a littoral owner will not retain the 
right to have the mean high-tide line continue as his property line.31 An 
avulsion can also occur through artificial means.32 An artificial avulsion 
takes place when a property owner or state actor suddenly and perceptively 
expands land mass over an area that was once water.33  Concerning the 
consequence of nullifying a property owner’s right to accretions, current 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. FLA. CONST. art. X. 
 27. See Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 500, 507 (Fla. 1918).  
 28. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Ass’n, Ltd., 512 So. 2d 
934, 936, 941 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a property owner who receives an accretion by 
artificial causes is entitled to that accretion even if he is not the party who participated in the 
actions that caused the accretion). 
 29. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2598 (2010).  
 30. Sand Key Ass’n, 512 So. 2d at 936. 
 31. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 32. Id. at 2611. 
 33. Id. 
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Florida law does not distinguish between treating artificial avulsions and 
ordinary avulsions differently.34 
C.  The Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
The Beach and Shore Preservation Act provides the State with the 
authority to engage in renourishment projects for the benefit of its citizens 
and establishes specific guidelines for initiating a project.35 When a beach 
restoration is undertaken, the Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal 
Improvement Trust Fund sets an erosion-control line.36 The erosion-
control line must be set in reference to the existing mean high-water line, 
although in theory it can be located seaward or landward of that.37 Once the 
erosion-control line is recorded, upland owners no longer have the right to 
have their property line increase with the mean high-water line through 
accretion.38 Since the renourishment project reclaims or adds a perceptible 
amount of land to the beachfront, it is likened to artificial avulsion, and a 
property owner will no longer have the right to the close boundary he once 
shared with the water. 
D.  Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection39 
In Stop the Beach, the United States Supreme Court examined Florida’s 
power to restore beaches through a process called renourishment.40 
Renourishment allows the State to deposit sand on eroded beaches 
(restoration) and to maintain the deposited sand (nourishment).41 The 
cause of action in Stop the Beach originated when the City of Destin and 
Walton County applied for permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach that had 
been eroded by a series of hurricanes.42 The project would add seventy-five 
feet of dry sand beach seaward of the mean high-tide line, effectively 
                                                                                                                                      
 34. Id. 
 35. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011 et. seq. (2002).  
 36. FLA. STAT. § 161.161(3)-(5) (2002).  
 37. FLA. STAT. § 161.161(5) (2002). 
 38. FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2003). 
 39. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592. 
 40. Id. at 2600-01.  
 41. FLA. STAT. § 161.021(3), (4).  
 42. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600. 
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depriving the littoral owner of his property line’s close proximity to the 
water line and permanently severing any future right to accretions.43 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a 
nonprofit corporation formed by individuals who own beachfront property 
bordering the project area that the State sought to address.44 Petitioner 
brought an administrative action to challenge the proposed project. 
Petitioner’s administrative action ultimately was rejected, and the permits 
to begin the renourishment project were issued to the City of Destin and 
Walton County.45 Petitioner then brought an action in state court, 
challenging the State’s actions on constitutional grounds.46 Petitioners 
argued that the State’s actions of beach renourishment would constitute an 
unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.47 
The Court of Appeal found that Petitioners were denied two littoral 
rights that had existed under riparian common law: the right to receive 
accretions to their property and the right to have the contact of their 
property with the water remain intact.48 The Court of Appeal found that 
this constituted an unconstitutional taking that could not stand unless the 
State could show it had an actual property interest in upland property or 
initiated eminent domain proceedings.49 On appeal, the Florida Supreme 
Court was asked to resolve the following question: “On its face, does the 
Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland 
owners of littoral rights without just compensation?”50 The Florida Supreme 
Court responded in the negative.51 A rehearing was denied, and the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.52 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See Save our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 56 (Fla. 2006). 
The named petitioner, Save our Beaches, Inc., was the other party challenging the Florida 
administrative action. Both challenging parties are non-profit groups composed of private 
property owners. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 59. 
 49. Id. at 60. 
 50. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 
2008). 
 51. Id. at 1121. 
 52. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2600 (2010). 
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The Supreme Court held in an 8-0 decision, from which Justice Stevens 
abstained,53 that the State’s actions did not constitute a taking.54 Thus, the 
Court affirmed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. The basis for the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision was that a taking cannot occur 
unless it can be shown that littoral property owners had rights to future 
accretions and contact with the water that were superior to the State’s right 
to fill in its submerged land.55 Under Florida property law, the State, as 
owner of land seaward of the mean high-tide line, has the right to fill that 
land, notwithstanding possible interference with the rights of the littoral 
landowners.56 Since renourishment constitutes an avulsion that exposes 
land seaward of the littoral property, that land belongs to the State, even 
though it interrupts the littoral owner’s contact with the water.57 Because 
the littoral owner will no longer have the right to have his property line 
maintained at the mean high-tide line, he will no longer have the right to 
accretions. 
The Court admitted that the result may seem counter-intuitive on its 
face.58 “After all, the Members’ property has been deprived of its character 
(and value) as oceanfront property by the State’s artificial creation of an 
avulsion.”59 The Court made the distinction that while this was an artificial 
avulsion, there was nothing in prior Florida law that gave different legal 
treatment to an artificial avulsion in contrast to one occurring naturally.60 
Additionally, the Court stated that there is jurisprudence suggesting they 
should be treated the same.61 Notably, the Court did not render a judgment 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. It is noted that Justice Stevens’s recusal from this decision is due to his ownership of 
beach-front property in Florida. See Lisa McElroy, The last week of opinions in plain English, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2010, 8:56 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/the-last-week-
of-opinions-in-plain-english/. 
 54. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2613. 
 55. Id. at 2611-13. 
 56. See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799-800 (Fla. 1957). 
 57. See Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1970). 
 58. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (“Perhaps state-created avulsions ought to be treated differently from other 
avulsions insofar as the property right to accretion is concerned. But nothing in prior Florida 
law makes such a distinction, and Martin suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the contrary.”); 
see also Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (1927) (holding that the draining of a state-owned 
swamp that borders a property owner’s land constitutes an avulsion that does not vest the 
upland owner with title to the newly exposed land). 
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on whether an artificial avulsion could ever constitute a taking—leaving 
open the possibility that a higher degree of property deprivation might 
merit revisiting the issue.  
Property law is a product of the common law, and property rights 
“extend only as far as state property law says they do.”62 States have a great 
deal of discretion in deciding how far they will extend property rights.63 
Since the Takings Clause protects property rights only as established under 
State law, the Court found it was not free to decide how these property 
rights ought to have been established.64 
Petitioner also argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
constituted a taking of Petitioner’s littoral rights, contrary to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.65 This issue was 
the source of vigorous disagreement among the members of the Court. Not 
only was there no clear majority, but the Justices’ opinions were also very 
different in character and substance.66 
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, supported a Judicial 
Takings Doctrine.67 The plurality justified this approach by implementing a 
textual analysis. “There is no textual justification for saying that . . . a State’s 
power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies 
according to the branch . . . it would be absurd to allow a State to do by 
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”68 
The plurality also articulated that “if a court declares that what was once an 
established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that 
property in violation of the Takings Clause.”69 Under this test, if it were 
found that a court rendered a decision that violated the Takings Clause, 
                                                                                                                                      
 62. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the 
Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 833-34 (2006) (“For most purposes we 
still adhere to the view that state law, not federal law, is the primary source and determinant 
of the scope and limits of property.”). 
 63. See id. at 834.  
 64. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 65. Id. at 2600. 
 66. Id. at 2592, 2596, 2613, 2618 (providing examples of the plurality and concurring 
opinions of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer). 
 67. Id. at 2597 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 68. Id. at 2601 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at 2601. 
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then there would be no need for compensation because the decision would 
simply be invalid.70  
The remaining Justices took markedly different directions on the issue of 
the Takings Clause. A concurring opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, 
endorsed a Due Process Clause analysis as an alternative to a Judicial 
Takings Doctrine: “The Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a 
judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established 
property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is ‘arbitrary 
or irrational’ under the Due Process Clause.”71  
The other concurring opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, agreed that no 
taking had occurred, but refused to adopt either approach taken by the rest 
of the Court. Justice Breyer argued that it was unnecessary for the Court to 
establish a specific standard of analysis for resolving the issue.72 Despite the 
divergence in methodology represented by the plurality and concurring 
opinions, a six-member majority of the Court felt that there should be a 
remedy when it is held that a judicial decision eliminates or substantially 
changes an established property right.73 This stands for the proposition that 
judicial development of the common law has the ability to violate the 
Constitution in the same way that a legislative or executive development 
could. 
E.  The Judicial Takings Doctrine 
The modern basis for the Judicial Takings Doctrine is grounded in a 
textual approach to interpretation. The text of the Takings Clause is not 
directed toward any particular branch of government and is concerned only 
                                                                                                                                      
 70. Notably, the plurality’s test for the Judicial Takings Doctrine did not include a 
manageable standard that a subsequent court could use to determine whether a property 
owner suffered a deprivation of established property rights. This lack of a manageable 
standard will be discussed more extensively in Part III.C. 
 71. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that since the Court unanimously 
agreed that no taking had occurred, the question of what should occur when it is found that 
a judicial decision has changed or destroyed a once established property right should be left 
for another day).  
 73. This assertion is represented by Justice Scalia’s and Justice Kennedy’s opinions. Id. at 
2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 2615 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). The fact that a 
majority of the Court agreed that there should be a remedy when it is found that a judicial 
decision eliminates a property right supports the notion that the application of a doctrine 
that limits a judicial change in property law is an idea that the court endorsed.  
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with the act of taking rather than with the branch performing the act.74 
Since the State’s power to expropriate private property does not vary 
according to which branch performs the act, the argument follows that the 
restrictions of the Takings Clause should be applied neutrally to restrain 
any branch of government from committing acts that effect a taking.75 
From a textual perspective, it is unlikely that the authors of the Bill of 
Rights considered the applicability of the Takings Clause provisions to the 
judiciary.76 The original understanding was too narrow to raise the issue.77 
The Takings Clause addressed not an indirect, regulatory taking that a 
judicial property change resembles, but rather a traditional exercise of 
eminent domain.78 That the power of the purse was vested exclusively in the 
legislature79 gives rise to the notion that the founders did not foresee the 
judiciary as having the ability to effectuate a full constitutional taking. How 
could a branch of government provide for just compensation if it is without 
authority to do so? This is not meant to postulate that the founders believed 
the Takings Clause provisions to be inviolable by the judiciary, but simply 
that a taking could not occur under the judicial branch because the 
judiciary was without the tools or authority to provide for just 
compensation.  
The first case to suggest that takings protections were applicable to the 
judiciary was also the case that established that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the states—Chicago, Burlington 
& Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago.80 In that case, the United States Supreme 
Court unanimously held that the takings protections applied to the courts: 
 In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be 
authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the 
state or under its direction for public use, without compensation 
made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, 
wanting in the due process of law required by the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment of the [C]onstitution of the United States, and the 
affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the state is a 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334-
35 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 75. See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 76. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1458. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 80. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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denial by that state of a right secured to the owner by that 
instrument.81 
In Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad,82 the Supreme Court was 
asked to review a New York Court of Appeals decision that denied the 
plaintiff recovery in a dispute over easements.83 The plaintiffs were property 
holders who sought to enjoin the defendants from building an elevated 
railway that would violate the plaintiffs’ property easements to light, air, 
and access.84  
The Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals, holding 
that the elevated railway took the plaintiffs’ property and impaired their 
contractual rights, which flowed from deeds to the street that had been 
conveyed by a predecessor-in-interest to the city, providing that an elevated 
railway would not burden the property.85 In Justice McKenna’s plurality 
opinion, the Court implied that courts could not constitutionally strip 
owners of their property in the name of judicial expediency in overruling 
prior precedents.86 In Muhlker, the plaintiffs challenged the New York 
statute that authorized construction of the elevated railway rather than the 
New York Court of Appeals’ decision disavowing and distinguishing its 
prior precedents.87 In this context, Justice McKenna’s opinion can be 
interpreted as “addressing not the power of state courts to change property 
law, but rather their power to insulate a legislative taking from 
constitutional review by asserting that a property right never existed.”88 
This opinion was contrasted by the concurring opinion of Justice 
Holmes, who strongly objected to the possibility that a federal court should 
have the power to interfere in a matter directly related to state law.89 Justice 
Holmes opined that property law was a “construction of the courts,” and 
that state courts should be free to change the law at will without 
constitutional restrictions.90 The view expressed by Justice Holmes stands 
                                                                                                                                      
 81. Id. at 241. 
 82. Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905). 
 83. See id. at 563. 
 84. Id. at 545. 
 85. Id. at 568.  
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for the proposition that there are no constitutional restrictions on a state 
court’s changing of existing state property law.91 It has been noted that 
Justice Holmes’s position may be more complex.92 Significantly, Justice 
Holmes noted that if the change in law had been a result of a legislative, 
rather than a judicial, action he still would not have found a taking.93 This 
suggests that Justice Holmes espoused that a particularly high threshold 
must be met before a taking will occur.  
A few decades later, the Court transitioned to a view consistent with 
Justice Holmes’s opinion in Muhlker.94 In the 1930s, the idea that judicial 
changes in the law could affect a taking was strongly rejected.95 In 
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,96 the Court emphasized in 
dicta that mere changes in the law did not present a constitutional question 
and that “constitutional restrictions on changes in the common law were 
inconsistent with the very nature of common law.”97  
Only two years after Hill, the Court again considered the question of 
whether a judicial change in property law by a state court can create a 
constitutional issue. In Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining 
Co.,98 the Court found that a change in the law, without more, did not 
present a constitutional issue.99 In Great Northern Railway, Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo found that a state court could overrule a prior case only 
prospectively.100  
Professor Barton H. Thompson opined that by the end of the New Deal, 
it seemed that the Court had disposed of the concept of judicial takings.101 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that courts could take property 
by changing the law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continued to follow 
the Muhlker view that the Court could reconsider a state court decision if a 
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property holder challenged a legislative or executive action as a taking and 
the state court ruled there was no property to take.102 
After Great Northern Railway, the idea of judicial takings lay dormant for 
more than three decades until the Supreme Court breathed new life into the 
theory. In Hughes v. Washington,103 the Court was asked to determine 
whether a property owner or the State took possession to an accretion that 
had been gradually deposited on the portion of the owner’s property 
abutting the ocean.104 The Supreme Court held that the ownership was an 
issue of federal law, not state law; and under federal law, the plaintiff was 
the proper owner of the accretions.105 
Concurring in the opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the majority 
opinion was based upon insufficient analysis.106 Justice Stewart argued that 
ownership was an issue of state law; the Fourteenth Amendment restricts 
states from taking property without just compensation “no less through its 
courts than through its legislature,” and the Washington Supreme Court 
was bound to observe a 1946 state decision that said accretions belong to 
the adjoining land owner.107  
After Hughes, the Court has been hesitant to take up judicial takings to 
any great degree. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,108 the United 
States Supreme Court was asked to review a California Supreme Court 
decision that required public shopping centers to permit political 
petitioners on their premises, contrary to earlier precedent.109 The plaintiff 
challenged the decision under the Takings Clause and argued that the 
California Supreme Court’s decision constituted a judicial taking.110 The 
United States Supreme Court declined to adopt a judicial takings test and 
decided the case using a conventional takings standard.111 The Court 
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concluded that although there had been a taking of property, since the value 
and use of the shopping center were not unreasonably impaired, it did not 
constitute a judicial taking.112 While the Court did not rule on the claimed 
taking by “judicial reconstruction” of the state’s laws, it did suggest that a 
taking by judicial action is conceivable.113  
In 1992, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council114 
considered whether a State law that denied a property owner all beneficial 
economic use of his land would constitute a taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.115 In Lucas, the petitioner had purchased coastal property with 
the intention of building homes on it as other neighboring owners had 
done.116 After the petitioner purchased the property, the South Carolina 
legislature passed a law that prohibited significant construction on his land, 
rendering his property valueless.117 While the Supreme Court ultimately 
overturned South Carolina’s law as an unconstitutional per se taking, the 
Court left an interesting exception to the rule intact.118 The exception 
provides that if the property owner never had the right to engage in the 
desired use of the property according to the background principles of the 
state’s property law, then just compensation need not be provided.119 
The Court’s opinion in Lucas is particularly important to note when 
approaching the idea of judicial takings addressed in Stop the Beach. While 
the Lucas Court addressed the issue of background principles when 
reviewing state property law, it did not determine what exactly constitutes 
background principles and which branch can provide these principles.120 
III.  ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES: JUDICIAL TAKINGS V. DUE PROCESS 
The decision in Stop the Beach offers two distinct options that 
subsequent courts could adopt when considering whether a state court’s 
action has constituted a taking in violation of the Takings Clause. Many 
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recent Supreme Court cases, including Lucas and Stop the Beach, have 
focused on a state legislature’s actions that restrict a property owner’s right 
to develop or enjoy coastal property.121 With the continuing development of 
private property on the nation’s coastlines and the growing movement to 
preserve environmental and aesthetic elements of our seashores, the balance 
between these interests will likely rest in judicial determinations and the 
methodology that subsequent courts choose to adopt. These judicial 
determinations have compelling implications in the subject of private 
property rights and economic stability.  
The remainder of this Note will not seek to strike a balance between 
these competing interests. This Note instead focuses on the two competing 
methodologies articulated in Stop the Beach to assess whether a state court’s 
ruling has deprived an owner of a property right: Judicial Takings and Due 
Process. Significantly, this Note addresses the doctrine of artificial avulsion 
and incorporates the doctrine into the methodological analysis. 
A.  Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection 
The Judicial Takings Doctrine argued for in Stop the Beach is easily 
explained. If it is found that a court deprives an individual of an established 
property right, then the court has effected a taking.122 Under this test, if it is 
determined that a court’s action constitutes a taking, no compensation will 
be considered, and the lower court’s ruling will be overturned.123  
Ostensibly, Lucas and Stop the Beach share many similarities regarding 
the circumstances that brought the cases to court. Both cases were initiated 
because of an alleged deprivation of property rights by each case’s respective 
state legislature. While the Lucas Court found that the legislature’s actions 
were per se unconstitutional, the door left open by the Court is arguably the 
same door that enabled the Florida legislature to implement the 
renourishment process that led to the dispute in Stop the Beach.124 
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The test proposed by the plurality in Stop the Beach outlined two prongs 
that must be considered when determining whether a court’s action 
constitutes a taking: deprivation and an established property right.125 
Additionally, the plurality posits that the test incorporates a considerable 
degree of deference to state courts:126 “A property right is not established if 
there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make 
our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.”127  
On its face, this test makes sense because the Takings Clause protects 
property rights only as established according to state law, not according to 
how the courts think property rights should be established.128 The test 
stands for the proposition that if a property right is in dispute, then it will 
neither be interpreted as an established property right nor will the property 
owner be afforded the benefit of using the Judicial Takings Doctrine.  
While courts will defer to state property law, the courts will not defer to 
state judges whose challenged decisions deprive claimants of established 
property rights.129 This is because an alleged Takings Clause violation is a 
question of law under the Federal Constitution. Similarly, in a situation 
where it is alleged that a state has violated an individual’s right to Due 
Process, there is no deference afforded to a state court’s decision that 
interprets the Federal Constitution.130 
Notably, the Court did not articulate a test to determine whether a 
deprivation of a property right has occurred. In balancing the interests of a 
property owner and the state, it is crucial to determine whether an actual 
deprivation of property occurred. In Stop the Beach, the Court did not need 
to approach the question of what degree of deprivation is needed to 
constitute a taking of an established property right. The Court found that 
Petitioner had no established property right for the property to maintain 
contact with the water line, meaning that Petitioner did not have a right of 
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which it could be deprived.131 Part IV further discusses this crucial 
distinction.132 
B.  Implementation of a Judicial Takings Doctrine 
Until Stop the Beach, little modern jurisprudential authority advocated a 
Judicial Takings Doctrine. Accepting a Judicial Takings Doctrine would 
present the corollary question of what remedy should be applied. Within 
the confines of judicial authority, it is difficult to imagine a court-provided 
remedy outside of a simple reversal of the lower court’s decision. This is 
because the judiciary lacks the ability to provide for compensation.133 
Absent legislative intervention providing for a specific remedy, the judicial 
branch would likely be confined to prudential remedies without a 
compensation element. 
Legislation-driven alternatives proposed by scholars could provide 
different remedies to the problem of compensation if it is found that a 
judicial action constitutes a taking. Professor Thompson theorized about 
three such alternatives. First, the state court could decide not to change the 
law at all.134 Second, the legislature could adopt an “automatic 
compensation approach.”135 Under this approach, the court would make a 
change in the law and would grant an order for the legislature to provide 
just compensation.136 Finally, the legislature could adopt a “legislative 
choice approach.”137 The court would issue a ruling contingent on the 
legislature’s taking action within a prescribed period of time.138 If the 
legislature did not act to provide just compensation, the decision would not 
take effect.139 
Adding a compensation element to the Judicial Takings Doctrine would 
streamline the process, creating efficiencies within the judicial and 
legislative branches. If a taking is found, then it is possible that the judiciary 
could dispose of the issue without the need to send it back to the legislature 
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or agency for additional consideration. This approach, however, would 
constitute a massive delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. Adding 
a compensation element would give the judicial branch the power to make 
legislative decisions based on the underlying public policy issues at stake. 
Any approach like this would have to originate in the legislature and would 
present serious constitutional questions that are beyond the scope of this 
Note.  
C.  Judicial Takings as a Remedy to Economic Deprivation 
In Stop the Beach, the Justices unanimously agreed that Florida’s 
renourishment process created an artificial avulsion and did not constitute 
a taking.140 The question of whether an artificial avulsion could ever 
constitute a taking was not presented, and the Court did not make a 
determination, express or in dicta, on whether a state-created artificial 
avulsion could ever constitute a taking.141 The implications from Stop the 
Beach are that the Court intentionally left this question open for another 
day and that a state-sanctioned act may constitute a taking if a greater 
deprivation of private property can be shown. 
Stop the Beach was a facial challenge to the Beach and Shore Preservation 
Act.142 In addition to the facial challenge, Petitioners alleged that the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision constituted a taking in violation of the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.143 Petitioners did not 
allege any quantifiable amount of economic deprivation as a result of the 
decision. 
If a similar case presented itself where a property owner could prove a 
quantifiable economic deprivation, then the Court might be more inclined 
to grant relief. Instead of a group of private property owners, as in Stop the 
Beach, what if the Court were presented with a petitioner who operated a 
large full-service luxury resort? Further, assume this resort owner contends 
that the resort’s attraction is cabana-style beach house rentals only twenty-
five feet from the high tide marker. Additionally, the resort owner can prove 
that an artificial avulsion, adding several feet of public beach between the 
water and his property, will result in substantial economic hardship for the 
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resort. Under this hypothetical, assume that the Florida Supreme Court 
ruled that the State’s actions did not constitute a taking and that the Florida 
Supreme Court grounded its decision in a determination that an artificial 
avulsion does not constitute a taking. 
In this hypothetical, the Supreme Court of Florida followed the Lucas 
Court’s background principles test and determined that an artificial 
avulsion does not constitute a taking as the linchpin in depriving the resort 
owner of economic recourse.144 Notably, the court’s decision interpreting, 
and arguably changing state common law, resulted in the alleged taking.145 
Under the test proposed in Stop the Beach, the court has not necessarily 
deprived a person of an established property right. The court, in this 
hypothetical, merely clarified a previously unclear property entitlement; 
therefore, the court cannot be said to have violated the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.146 
The distinction between Stop the Beach and the hypothetical lies in the 
ability to quantify actual economic deprivation. “While property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized 
as a taking.”147 Additionally, a regulation that deprives a property owner of 
all economically beneficial use of his property will constitute a taking.148 
While the hypothetical presents an alleged judicial taking, not a regulatory 
taking, the plurality in Stop the Beach argues that there is no reason to treat 
either form of taking differently.149 
The question thus becomes: under the judicial takings test in Stop the 
Beach, can a proven quantifiable economic deprivation be a basis for a 
judicial takings remedy? Additionally, it is unclear under the test whether 
economic deprivation should be analyzed under the deprivation portion of 
the test, under the established property right portion, or both. The test 
articulates that if a property right is in doubt, it will not be an established 
property right and deference will be given to the state court.150 It is not clear 
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whether the plurality’s test would be suitable for scrutinizing quantifiable 
economic deprivation.151 If economic deprivation is not given recognition 
within the judicial takings test, the test would prove to be an under-
inclusive and inadequate remedy.  
While Lucas specifically concerned a regulation that eliminated all 
reasonable economic use of a property and rendered the property valueless, 
it did not answer the question of whether deprivation of any quantifiable 
economic use of the property would constitute a taking. Additionally, the 
concurring opinion notes the importance of incorporating reasonable 
expectations into the analysis, specifically the reasonable expectations of the 
property owner in terms of use of the land.152 
Under the presented hypothetical, it could be argued that the resort 
owner has a reasonable expectation to operate his business without 
disruptive changes in the character and nature of his property. There is a 
tendency toward circularity in these types of arguments since an owner’s 
reasonable expectations are often shaped by what courts allow “as a proper 
exercise of governmental authority.”153 Nevertheless, determining a 
property owner’s reasonable expectations may not be a completely circular 
endeavor since these constitutionally protected expectations “are based on 
objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all 
parties involved.”154 
D.  Substantive Due Process 
The Supreme Court recognizes that the Due Process Clause is a 
limitation on judicial power.155 Additionally, the “Court has long 
recognized that property regulations can be invalidated under the Due 
Process Clause.”156 Justice Kennedy used these two accepted premises as the 
basis for his argument that substantive Due Process would provide a 
remedy when a judicial decision eliminates or substantially changes 
established property rights.157 Justice Kennedy stated: “The Court would be 
on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or 
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substantially changes established property rights, which are a legitimate 
expectation of the owner, is ‘arbitrary or irrational’ under the Due Process 
Clause.”158  
Courts, unlike the legislative and executive branches, were not designed 
to make policy decisions about expropriation.159 In his concurrence, Justice 
Kennedy argued that the separation-of-powers principles implicitly place 
limitations on the courts.160 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the Due Process 
limitation exists because the legislative and executive branches are 
accountable for takings in their political capacity.161  
Considering Justice Kennedy’s analysis, it is plausible that a Due Process 
Clause challenge could be maintained under the hypothetical presented in 
Part III.C. The success of this challenge, however, will hinge on whether the 
Court determines that the state court’s action is arbitrary or irrational.162 
Depending on how the Court applies the test, this may be a particularly 
difficult standard to satisfy. 
Justice Kennedy’s Due Process Clause analysis ostensibly validates it as 
an adequate substitute for the Judicial Takings Doctrine. The disconnect in 
the analysis seems to come in deducing that since property regulations can 
be invalidated through the Due Process Clause, so can judicial decisions.163 
This is a precarious deduction given the vast wealth of Due Process Clause 
jurisprudence.  
Additionally, the Court has long held that substantive Due Process rights 
do not include economic liberties.164 If substantive Due Process rights 
extended to an alleged judicial change in property law affecting economic 
rights, it would signal a wholesale reversal in modern Due Process Clause 
jurisprudence. The plurality in Stop the Beach stated that if a subsequent 
court accepted Due Process as a remedy, it would be “a step of much greater 
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novelty, [with a] much more unpredictable effect, than merely applying the 
Takings Clause to judicial action.”165 
This unpredictability would be compounded by the need to protect state 
property law that operates within the bounds of the Constitution from 
unwarranted judicial action that could interfere with a state’s sovereign 
authority to enact common law. The need for a system of review that 
affirmatively accounts for economic deprivation signals that a review under 
the Due Process Clause would be unpredictable at best and wholly 
inadequate at worst. 
If Justice Kennedy’s arbitrary and irrational standard were adopted, it is 
unclear how the standard would be implemented and what guidance a 
reviewing court would have in reviewing a lower court’s decision. 
Presumably, the burden of establishing that the court acted in an arbitrary 
and irrational way would be allocated to the party complaining of the 
property deprivation.166 In many cases that adopt this test, the controversies 
result from a state or government regulation that has only an indirect 
economic effect on the challenging party.167 Judicial decisions that have a 
detrimental economic effect on property should be held to a higher 
standard than what a Due Process review can provide.  
IV.  PROPOSAL 
The viability of the Judicial Takings Doctrine depends largely on whether 
the Court specifically tailors the doctrine to target judicial decisions that 
trigger an actual substantive change in state property law. An important 
consideration when making a decision regarding the applicability of the 
Judicial Takings Doctrine is a proper determination of whether a judicial 
decision actually changed a law or merely interpreted it within proper 
judicial parameters.  
In applying the judicial takings test, the Court should first decide 
whether the lower court’s ruling affected an established property right. In 
doing so, the Court should consider the property owner’s reasonable 
expectation to this right in accordance with established state property law.168 
This would provide an important baseline for incorporating economic 
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deprivation into the analysis. A property owner’s expectation of economic 
stability, in the face of state or court intervention with established property 
law, is an important factor in determining reasonable expectations under 
the Lucas framework.169  
Second, to achieve the purported benefits of a Judicial Takings Doctrine 
and to shield it from the potential usurpation of legislative power, the Court 
should adopt a manageable standard to determine whether a deprivation 
occurred. Adopting a manageable standard to determine whether a 
deprivation occurred will retain the core of the plurality’s judicial takings 
test in Stop the Beach.170 A manageable standard will supplement the test by 
ensuring that the degree of economic deprivation is a relevant factor in 
determining whether a deprivation has occurred. In making this 
determination, the Court should give consideration to the following 
relevant factors: the degree of deprivation,171 the departure from state 
common law,172 and judicial decisions as a legislative taking.173 
A.  Degree of Deprivation 
An important consideration in the analysis of whether a judicial taking 
occurred is the degree of deprivation that a property owner realized as a 
result of the court’s decision. While a legislature or administrative body 
may look at several considerations in making a legislative determination, 
including how the law or rule will be applied prospectively, a court’s 
resources limit it from making broad, exploratory investigations. Therefore, 
a court has the potential to inflict a greater deprivation of property rights by 
its ruling, well beyond its original intent.  
This factor would prove crucial to the determination because it would 
incorporate the important element of economic deprivation. Under this 
factor, a court would consider the economic deprivation that a property 
owner suffered, or will prospectively suffer, as a result of a judicial change in 
property law. Commensurate with the plurality’s position in Stop the Beach, 
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if it is found that a state court’s decision constituted a taking, then its 
decision will be overruled.174 
B.  Departure from State Common Law 
A measurable departure from established state common law would 
trigger a presumption that the judicial decision went beyond mere 
interpretation of existing common law principles. This factor would be 
important because it would value the court’s role as an unbiased interpreter 
of the law, rather than as an extra-judicial, legislative body.  
Under the Lucas framework, the test would analyze the background 
principles of common law and would determine whether the judicial 
interpretation of those principles coincides with current state common 
law.175 If it is determined that the court’s interpretation of the background 
principles is inconsistent with state common law, then a Judicial Takings 
Test would be implemented to determine whether a taking occurred as a 
result of that interpretation.176 
C.  Judicial Decision as a Legislative Taking 
If it is determined that a court’s action would constitute a taking if taken 
by the legislature, then that court decision should be reversed as a violation 
of the Takings Clause. This inquiry would be dispositive in determining 
whether a judicial decision constitutes a taking. This test would ensure that 
a judicial action is not insulated from a constitutional objection. This test is 
presented with the caveat that a state retains the power, and the right, to 
legislatively create state-specific property law.  
If a state were to create a statute, like the court did through judicial 
action under the hypothetical in Part III.C,177 then that statute could be 
challenged only as a traditional taking. The remedy would not lie within the 
Judicial Takings Doctrine because no court actually changed or 
substantially modified a state law.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Adoption of the Judicial Takings Test, outlined in Part IV,178 would not 
change the result in Stop the Beach. Petitioner in Stop the Beach did not 
have an established right to accretions or independent contact with the 
water that superseded the State’s right to maintain the coastlines.179 Within 
the background principles of Florida law and without a greater deprivation, 
it would be unreasonable to conclude that a private property owner’s 
interest in maintaining, in perpetuity, an unchanging boundary with the 
water would rise to the level of being a reasonable expectation.  
Even within the confines of Florida property law, it is possible that a 
similar property deprivation could render a different result. For instance, a 
different result could be reached in the case of a property owner who could 
prove a quantifiable economic deprivation, coupled with a reasonable 
expectation under Lucas, that his property rights would remain undisturbed 
by state action.180 If nothing else, the Court’s opinion in Stop the Beach 
sends a clear message to state courts that their actions concerning property 
law are not immune from constitutional scrutiny.  
While a Due Process Clause analysis presents an attractive option for 
challenging a court decision that changes or substantially alters a state 
property law, its jurisprudential viability is problematic and any remedy it 
could provide is uncertain.  
The Takings Clause “‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior.”181 Since the 
Takings Clause provides an explicit constitutional protection from 
government action that affects property, courts should not be permitted to 
use the generalized notion of substantive Due Process to analyze these 
claims.182 
A narrowly tailored Judicial Takings Doctrine has the potential to 
provide an additional protective measure against a measurable judicial 
change in property law. Additionally, it would create assurance and 
predictability for businesses and other investors who want to purchase and 
develop property on the nation’s coastline or waterways.  
                                                                                                                                      
 178. See supra Part IV. 
 179. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2612-13. 
 180. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035. 
 181. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 395 (1994)). 
 182. Id.; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
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It is significant that in Stop the Beach, six of the eight voting Justices held 
that if it is found that a judicial change in property law deprives an owner of 
a right the owner once had, then there is a remedy. Adoption of a Judicial 
Takings Doctrine, as outlined in Part IV, will provide a certain remedy, 
which takes into account economic deprivation while leaving intact a state’s 
sovereign right to enact substantive property law. 
 

